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INTRODUCTION
In August 1935, Lloyd Gaines, a recent Black graduate from Lincoln
University—then a Black-only college operated by the University of
Missouri—submitted an application for admission into the University of
Missouri Law School, as Lincoln University did not have a law school at the
time.1 Upon receipt of Gaines’ application, the University of Missouri
directed him to contact Lincoln University instead, pointing Gaines to a
recently enacted state statute which promised provision of tuition for any law
school in an adjacent state “[p]ending the full development of the Lincoln
university.”2 In other words, because the school only offered tuition funds to
Black students attending out-of-state law schools, the University of Missouri
would not accept Black law school applicants and Gaines could only apply to
an out-of-state law school. While Gaines was otherwise qualified to attend
the University of Missouri School of Law, he was refused admission on the
grounds of his race.3 Gaines promptly brought an action against the
University of Missouri, arguing that this denial violated the Fourteenth
Amendment and demanding admission into the law school.4 The Supreme
Court found that the state of Missouri was compelled to procure a legal
education for Gaines within the state, rather than providing tuition for an outof-state school, and determined that Gaines was entitled admission to the
University of Missouri School of Law if no other legal education was available
in the state.5 Gaines’ story of exclusion is but a vignette of the myriad
struggles Black students and other students of color have faced while
attempting to gain entry into institutions of higher education in the United
States.6
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 342(1938).
Id. at 342.
Id. at 343.
Id. at 342.
Id. at 352. Just under two years after this momentous victory, Gaines disappeared and was
never to be heard from or seen again—he ultimately never enrolled in the University of Missouri.
To this day, Gaines’ disappearance baffles historians and civil rights activists, but his legacy remains
alive and well; students at the University of Missouri recently implored the school to erect a statue
of Gaines next to the University of Missouri School of Law. Kathryn Palmer, Legacy of Missing Lloyd
Gaines, 1928 Supreme Court Plaintiff, Still Haunts Higher Education, KBIA (Dec. 12, 2018),
https://www.kbia.org/post/legacy-missing-lloyd-gaines-1938-supreme-court-plaintiff-still-hauntshigher-education#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/SXE5-YRV2].
6 See generally Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 629 (1950) (discussing other educational
opportunities provided to Black students in light of their exclusion from the University of Texas Law
School); McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 639-40 (1950) (considering
a Black Univ. of Okla. student who was accepted to the university on the condition that he remain
segregated from white students); Sipuel v. Board of Regents of University of Okl., 332 U.S. 631, 63132 (1948) (discussing the case of petitioner Sipuel, a Black student who was rejected from the
University of Oklahoma School of Law on the basis of her race despite being otherwise qualified).
1
2
3
4
5
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While policy-based mechanisms of excluding students of color from
higher education have dissolved, students hailing from these groups continue
to face systemic barriers to colleges and universities across the United States.
A study by the U.S. Department of Education found that, compared to white
students, a disproportionate number of Black students enroll in community
colleges or for-profit institutions (which usually entail higher tuition rates
and lower graduation rates) than four-year universities.7 Additionally, white
adults are twice as likely to hold at least a bachelor’s degree than Hispanic
adults,8 and only 19% of college-aged Indigenous students are enrolled in
college as compared to 41% of the overall U.S. population.9 In the wake of the
Civil Rights Movement, many universities attempted to address the severe
lack of diversity on their campuses by initiating affirmative action policies—
mechanisms for increasing the enrollment of students hailing from diverse
and historically disadvantaged backgrounds.10 These measures took on
various forms, such as “opportunity programs” through which universities
evaluated applicants devoid of concrete admission requirements; targeted
recruitment efforts at local high schools; the consideration of race during
application review; and the creation “points” systems through which
applicants hailing from certain minority backgrounds would be granted an
admissions “boost.”11
Decades later, Abigail Fisher, a white applicant to the University of Texas
at Austin, filed a lawsuit against the school alleging that its affirmative action
7 See Walter R. Allen, Channel McLewis, Chantal Jones, & Daniel Harris, From Bakke to Fisher:
African American Students in U.S. Higher Education Over Forty Years, 4 THE RUSSELL SAGE FOUND.
J. SOC. SCIS. 41, 43 (2018) (“[M]ore than 50 percent of all African American college students are
enrolled in community colleges, and only 40 percent of whites attend these institutions. African
American students are also overrepresented in for-profit institutions, where students pay higher
tuition, more frequently default on student loans, and graduate less often.”).
8 Richard Fry, Jesse Bennet & Amanda Barroso, Racial and Ethnic Gaps in the U.S. Persist on Key
Demographic
Indicators,
PEW
RSCH.
CTR.
(Jan.
12,
2021),
https://www.pewresearch.org/interactives/racial-and-ethnic-gaps-in-the-u-s-persist-on-keydemographic-indicators [https://perma.cc/3WY8-X9V6].
9 Factsheets: Native American Students, POSTSECONDARY NAT’L POL’Y INST. (Nov. 17, 2020)
https://pnpi.org/native-american-students [https://perma.cc/5A7B-GAPB].
10 Current scholarship remains split on what factors ultimately motivated schools to launch
affirmative action policies. Some question whether disruptive student action at certain elite schools
such as Harvard, Yale, and Princeton spearheaded affirmative action policies, while others have
theorized that the much larger urban unrest in cities such as Newark and Detroit, as well as the
Watts riots, pushed schools to action. Lisa M. Stulberg & Anthony S. Chen, The Origins of RaceConscious Affirmative Action in Undergraduate Admissions: A Comparative Analysis of Institutional Change
in Higher Education, 87 SOCIO. EDUC. 36, 37 (2013).
11 See, e.g., id. at 41-42 (highlighting examples of targeted recruitment and opportunity programs,
as well as admissions generally considering race in a student’s application at universities like Cornell,
Swarthmore, and Dartmouth); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 244 (2003) (“The current guidelines
use a selection method under which every applicant from an underrepresented racial or ethnic
minority group is automatically awarded 20 points of the 100 needed to guarantee admission.”).
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policy unlawfully discriminated against Fisher because she was white.12 While
Fisher’s academic credentials were unremarkable—indeed, the school
admitted only forty-seven applicants with grades and test scores lower than
Fisher’s, forty-two of them white—Fisher argued that the school rejected her
because its admissions process considered applicants’ race.13 Although the
Supreme Court ultimately ruled in the school’s favor,14 Fisher’s allegations
embodied a significant shift in claims regarding discrimination within
university admission. In the years following Gaines’ lawsuit, white plaintiffs
began pushing back against schools’ attempts to rectify abysmal levels of
campus diversity through race-based affirmative action policies. Students
who did not stand to benefit from affirmative action began to seek legal relief
against schools implementing such policies, alleging that race-based
affirmative action violated federal constitutional rights to equal protection.15
In addressing these disputes, courts have required schools to first consider
race-neutral alternatives to race-based admissions policies to achieve their
diversity goals.16 In recent years, the standard has evolved into a requirement
that no workable race-neutral alternative exist for a school to maintain a racebased affirmative action program.17 Such a requirement appears inconsistent
with the overall goals of race-based affirmative action plans—how can a school

12 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 297 (2013) (discussing Abigail Fisher’s
allegations that the University’s affirmative action policy constituted unlawful racial discrimination).
13 Nikole Hannah-Jones, What Abigail Fisher’s Affirmative Action Case Was Really About,
PROPUBLICA (June 23, 2016, 12:28 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/a-colorblindconstitution-what-abigail-fishers-affirmative-action-case-is-r [https://perma.cc/9PKR-5FYA].
14 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2215 (2016).
15 See, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 507 P.2d 1169, 1175 (Wash. 1973) (“[T]he Admissions
Committee followed certain procedures which are the crux of plaintiff ’s claimed denial of equal
protection of the laws.”); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 277 (1978) (“[The plaintiff]
alleged that the Medical School’s special admissions program operated to exclude him from the
school on the basis of his race, in violation of his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”); Gratz, 539 U.S. at 244 (“Petitioners filed this class action alleging
the University’s use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”) Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 306 (2003) (finding
against the plaintiff and holding the University of Michigan Law School violated plaintiff ’s
fourteenth amendment rights to equal protection through their admissions policies); Fisher, 570 U.S.
297, 297 (2013); Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2198-99; Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and
Fellows of Harvard Coll., 397 F. Supp. 3d 126, 131 (D. Mass. 2019) (“Plaintiff . . . alleges that
Defendant . . . discriminates against Asian American applicants in the undergraduate admissions
process to Harvard College in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”).
16 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 309, 339 (“Narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every
conceivable race-neutral alternative . . . [it] does, however, require serious, good faith consideration
of workable race-neutral alternatives that will achieve the diversity the university seeks.”).
17 Fisher, 570 U.S. at 312 (“The reviewing court must ultimately be satisfied that no workable
race-neutral alternatives would produce the educational benefits of diversity.”); Students for Fair
Admissions, 397 F. Supp. at 177 (“Harvard may consider race to achieve diversity only if there is no
workable race-neutral alternative to the consideration of race to ensure a sufficiently diverse class.”).
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which hopes to increase racial diversity achieve such diversity through nonracial means?
In this Comment, I argue that the current jurisprudence on affirmative
action in institutions of higher education rests on the continued centering of
whiteness, ultimately creating a doctrine which attempts to achieve a
“painless” solution to racial injustice through prioritizing the need to ensure
no race-neutral alternatives exist. Ultimately, this “painless” cure places a
substantial roadblock in the path to true racial equity in higher education. By
white centering, I refer to the ways in which whiteness is prioritized and acts
as the focal point for any discussion of diversity and racial equity—and, in
this instance, affirmative action—with non-white interests fashioned as a
lesser priority.18
Part I discusses the meaning of white centering and provide a brief
overview of how white centering has manifested as non-white individuals
have struggled for equality throughout United States history. Part II analyzes
how courts have determined to whom the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 applies, finding that courts’ expansion of these
protections beyond Black individuals paved a pathway for white individuals
to invoke these safeguards in affirmative action efforts. Part III explores the
development of affirmative action jurisprudence and the race-neutral
alternative test. There, I conclude that the requirement that schools have no
workable race-neutral alternative before turning to race-based affirmative
action is the result of the Court’s centering of white demands and interests
over the past 50 years. By focusing its analysis on the potential harms that
race-based affirmative action policies could bring upon white individuals, the
Court established a trend of prioritizing white interests while deprioritizing
the needs of Black Americans and other people of color.19 In Part IV, I assess
18 The phrase “white centering” has gained traction in recent years and has been used
increasingly beginning in the summer of 2020 to describe the tendency to focus on the wishes of
white individuals—and whiteness as both an idea and ideal—even in discussions about racial equity.
See Sarah Mayorga-Gallo, The White-Centering Logic of Diversity Ideology, 63 A M. B EHAV.
S CIENTIST 1789, 1789-90 (2019) (using the phrase “white centering” to refer to the prioritization
of “white people’s desires and feelings”). The phrase “white centering” has shown up in a variety of
conversations about racial equity, ranging from discussions about racism in religious spaces to antiracism social campaigns. See Brandi Miller, Reclaiming My Theology: From White Supremacy: White
Centering w. Rev. Dr. Brenda Salter McNeil, APPLE PODCASTS (Aug. 20, 2020),
https://podcasts.apple.com/ie/podcast/from-white-supremacy-white-centering-w-rev-drbrenda/id1516576461?i=1000488719859; Nicole Cardoza, Stop White Centering, ANTI-RACISM DAILY (Feb.
5,
2021)
https://www.antiracismdaily.com/archives/stop-white-centering-anti-racism-daily
[https://perma.cc/DBM4-ME3E].
19 I use the term “race-based affirmative action” rather than “race-conscious affirmative action”
in consideration of the fact that many proxy-based affirmative action plans such as class-based
affirmative action remain conscious of the ways in which socioeconomic status correlates with race
in the United States.
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the viability of so-called race-neutral alternatives to affirmative action
initiatives. There is substantial evidence that such race-neutral alternatives
are ineffective at achieving diversity, raising the question of why courts insist
on requiring schools to first ensure that no workable race-neutral alternatives
exist. Here, I argue that this insistence on race-neutral alternatives is a
product of the Court’s tendency to protect the interests of whiteness above
all else, especially with any attempts to remedy racial discrimination. Finally,
I argue that courts should acknowledge the legacy of white centering in
affirmative action jurisprudence and work to change this by refocusing their
analysis on the benefits that affirmative action will provide to Black and other
non-white minority students. Only through this way will courts achieve a
standard of review that allows schools to more freely pursue their goals of
campus diversity.
I. ON WHITE CENTERING
The term “white centering” entered anti-racist discourse with relative
force in the summer of 2020, when the United States faced a racial reckoning
following the murders of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor by police officers
in Minneapolis and Louisville, respectively.20 While the phrase rose to
mainstream usage in 2020, it has been used in previous years to address
frequent tendencies of both individuals and institutions to prioritize white
feelings and interests over those of people of color.21 In response to the
protests following George Floyd’s death, many companies announced efforts
to combat racism in their workplaces, some of which eventually came under
fire for disingenuity.22 Somewhere during this movement, the phrase “white
20 See generally Evan Hill, Ainara Tiefenthäler, Christiaan Triebert, Drew Jordan, Haley Willis
& Robin Stein ., How George Floyd Was Killed in Police Custody, THE N.Y. TIMES (last updated April
20,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/george-floyd-investigation.html
[https://perma.cc/LL8B-EYWY] (detailing the events leading up to and following George Floyd’s
murder); Amina Elahi, ‘Sleeping While Black’: Louisville Police Kill Unarmed Black Woman, NPR (May
13, 2020, 6:33 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/05/13/855705278/sleeping-while-black-louisville-policekill-unarmed-black-woman [https://perma.cc/Q868-MZK9] (detailing the events leading up to and
following Breonna Taylor’s murder); Radhika Chalasani, George Floyd Protests Aren’t Just Happening
in Big Cities, ABC NEWS (June 20, 2020, 11:29 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/article/george-floydprotests-happening-big-cities/story?id=71327256
[https://perma.cc/6C76-69MU]
(highlighting
smaller U.S. cities where racial justice protests unfolded in 2020).
21 See Mayorga-Gallo, supra note 18 at 1790 (discussing, in 2019, the ways in which discussions
of diversity have been subsumed by “white people’s desires and feelings”); Jemimah L. Young,
Marquita D. Foster & Dorothy Hines, Even Cinderella is White: (Re)Centering Black Girls’ Voices as
Literacies of Resistance, 107 ENG. J. 102, 102 (2018) (detailing the ways in which Black girls must be
re-centered in fiction after centuries of literature upholding whiteness as paramount).
22 For examples of these commitments and ensuing backlash, see The Estée Lauder Companies
Commits to Racial Equity, THE ESTÉE LAUDER COMPANIES INC. (June 10, 2020),
https://www.elcompanies.com/en/news-and-media/newsroom/company-features/2020/elc-commits-
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centering” gained widespread traction as a means of envisioning how the
concept of whiteness shapes social structures and ideals. The phrase has been
used to deconstruct entrenched racist ideology in Christianity,23 to discuss
the operation of white privilege in society,24 and to attack the underlying
assumptions and frameworks of conversations around diversity.25 According
to British author Layla Saad, “white centering is a natural consequence of
white supremacy. If you unconsciously believe you are superior, then you will
unconsciously believe that your worldview is the one that is superior, normal,
right, and that it deserves to be at the center.”26 Ultimately, in white
centering, white individuals position their own interests as paramount while
relegating the needs of Black, Indigenous, and other people of color as a
secondary consideration.
Although the phrase “white centering” has entered common discourse
only recently, scholars and authors have discussed societal structures which
clearly exemplify a tendency for white individuals to prioritize their own
desires and interests. Kimberlé Crenshaw, in analyzing the ways in which
mainstream feminism has historically excluded Black women, argued that
“discrimination against a white female is . . . the standard sex discrimination
claim; claims that diverge from this standard appear to present some sort of
hybrid claim.”27 Crenshaw highlights the tendency for society to use
whiteness as the central framework through which to understand sex
discrimination and womanhood, relegating Black women to a mere
afterthought.28 Further, Crenshaw highlights the fact that white women at
the 1851 Women’s Rights Conference in Ohio¾the site of Sojourner Truth’s
famous “Ain’t I a Woman?” speech¾objected to Truth’s participation, fearing
that she would shift the conversation from women’s suffrage to Black
to-racial-equity [https://perma.cc/2XB8-5HP4]; Gillian Friedman, Here’s What Companies Are
promising
to
Do
to
Fight
Racism,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
23,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/article/companies-racism-george-floyd-protests.html
[https://perma.cc/NK7W-F9R3]; Emma Hinchliffe, Exclusive: Ex-Glossier Employees Describe a
Company That Failed to Support Black Workers—Even as it Donated $1 Million to Racial Justice Causes,
FORTUNE (Aug. 18, 2020, 7:45 AM), https://fortune.com/2020/08/18/glossier-black-workers-donationsupport-black-lives-ceo-emily-weiss/ [https://perma.cc/PKP8-NHWM].
23 See Miller, supra note 18.
24 Austin Channing Brown, White Privilege Weariness (Part II), ROLL CALL WITH AUSTIN
CHANNING BROWN
(Apr.
1,
2014),
http://austinchanning.com/blog/tag/centering
[https://perma.cc/WGH8-F6SZ] (“I have been unable to stop thinking about how much healing
[Black people] need for ourselves, another reason why we must decenter whiteness.”).
25 Mayorga-Gallo, supra note 18, at 1789-90.
26 LAYLA F. SAAD, ME AND WHITE SUPREMACY: COMBAT RACISM, CHANGE THE
WORLD, AND BECOME A GOOD ANCESTOR 136 (2020).
27 Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique
of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 145
(1989).
28 Id. at 152.
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emancipation.29 The tendency of white women to position their own
whiteness as the sole framework for understanding feminism provides one
example of white centering at work even in the antebellum period.
During the Black American struggle for Civil Rights in the mid-1900s,
white centering manifested in the form of white Americans agreeing to
integration efforts only when such efforts aligned with their own interests.
Derrick Bell, a professor at Harvard Law School instrumental in the
development of critical race theory, asserted that this prioritization of white
interests appeared even in the assessment of anti-segregation claims.30
According to Bell, the Court’s mid-1900s shift from apprehensiveness about
integration to increasing attentiveness to the harms of segregation was at least
partially attributable to the ways in which integration would help “win the
hearts and minds” of people from developing countries in the struggle against
Communism.31 Additionally, Bell argued, southern white Americans began to
realize that integration was necessary for advancing southern society from a
“rural, plantation society to the sunbelt with all its potential and profit . . . .”32
Through this tendency to center whiteness, white individuals have often
imagined themselves as innocent victims of discrimination and, as such,
proactively worked to protect their own interests at the expense of
marginalized groups. Critical race scholar Cheryl Harris has argued that there
is a “property interest in whiteness [which] has skewed the concept of
affirmative action by focusing on the sin or innocence of individual white
claimants with vested rights as competitors of Blacks whose rights are
provisional and contingent, rather than on the broader questions of
distribution of benefits and burdens.”33 Harris’ theory is perhaps best
reflected in Shelley v. Kraemer, wherein white St. Louis residents attempted
to restrict local homeownership to white buyers and Black prospective buyers
were unable to obtain property interest in what white people previously
owned.34

Id. at 153.
Derrick A., Bell, Comment, Jr., Brown v., Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524-25 (1980).
31 Id. at 524.
32 Id. at 525.
33 Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1780 (1993).
34 The text of the attempted prohibition is as follows:
29
30

[H]ereafter no part of said property or any portion thereof shall be, for said term of
Fifty-years, occupied by any person not of the Caucasian race, it being intended hereby
to restrict the use of said property for said period of time against the occupancy as
owners or tenants of any portion of said property for resident or other purpose by
people of the Negro or Mongolian Race.
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1948).
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The positioning of white individuals as innocent and equally susceptible
to racial discrimination appears in the reasoning in Ricci v. DeStefano, where
the Supreme Court maintained that a city could not discard test results which
suggested a disparate impact on Black firefighters because such action would
constitute unlawful discrimination against the mostly white testers.35 Harris
and Professor Kimberly West-Faulcon argued that the Court’s ultimate
finding of unlawful discrimination against the white firefighters in Ricci
“whitened” discrimination by moving towards “converting efforts to rectify
racial inequality into white racial injury.”36 The Court in Ricci thus shifted the
discrimination analysis to focus chiefly on potential injuries sustained by
white individuals, maintaining that not only could white people suffer from
discrimination in the same manner as people of color, but that remedies for
racial inequity constituted discrimination against white people.37
White centering has taken shape over the years in affirmative action
jurisprudence in multiple ways. First, courts center whiteness by focusing on
the alleged harms that ostensibly befall white plaintiffs and similarly situated
students should affirmative action be permitted to continue in higher
education. Second, courts center whiteness by engaging in discourse which
frames whiteness as innocence, thus positioning white plaintiffs as
unreasonably and unjustly harmed by an institution that has decided to play
favorites. In the rest of this Comment, I will discuss the ways in which both
anti-discrimination legislation and affirmative action jurisprudence have
evolved in a way that inherently centers white desires and fears, as well as
how courts’ emphasis on race-neutral alternatives further prioritizes white
interests.
II. EXPANDING THE PROTECTIONS OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT BEYOND THE
MARGINALIZED
Over the past several decades, numerous lawsuits have arisen alleging that
race-based affirmative action policies at colleges and universities constitute
unlawful racial discrimination, with the plaintiffs usually identifying as
white.38 Moreover, some such lawsuits have involved white plaintiffs who had
35 Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 593 (2009) (highlighting that testers had studied for
months at “considerable personal and financial expense,” thus making the injury to them “all the
more severe.”).
36 Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening Discrimination, Racing
Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV. 73, 81 (2010).
37 Id.
38 See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 297 (2013) (assessing allegations
that the University of Texas at Austin’s affirmative action policy unlawfully discriminated against
the white plaintiff); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 306 (2003) (discussing a white plaintiff ’s
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average or below-average academic credentials, calling into question whether
they would have been admitted regardless of the school’s affirmative action
policy.39 This backlash is consistent with the ways in which equal protection
laws and affirmative action jurisprudence have evolved over the past two
centuries. Beginning with the development of the Fourteenth Amendment,
lawmakers and courts endeavored to protect white interests by assuring fellow
white Americans that any legislation would not unduly interfere with their
existing privileges.
In the years following the Civil War, certain lawmakers sought to provide
protections for newly emancipated African Americans and thus proposed
what would later be known as the Freedmen’s Bureau Act.40 The legislation
would create a Bureau which would provide food, land, and other necessities
to Southern freedmen, as well as white Civil War “refugees.”41 The 1866 bill
went through several iterations, with legislators in both the House and the
Senate taking issue with the ways in which the bill ostensibly favored Black
Americans over white Southerners.42 One Senator objected that the bill
would make African Americans “superior” to their white counterparts by
claims that the University of Michigan Law School’s affirmative action plan unlawfully discriminated
against the plaintiff because of her race) Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 244 (2003) (discussing a
white plaintiff ’s claims that the University of Michigan’s College of Literature, Science, and the Arts
implemented an affirmative action policy that unlawfully discriminated against the plaintiff because
of their race). Following her 2016 defeat in Supreme Court, Abigail Fisher became known to many
on the Internet as “Becky with the Bad Grades,” referring to Fisher’s apparent willingness to blame
her otherwise commonplace rejection on minority students. See Abby Jackson, People Are Tweeting a
Modified Beyoncé Lyric to Mock the Woman at the Center of the Supreme Court’s Case on Affirmative Action,
BUSINESS INSIDER (June 27, 2016, 6:18 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/what-becky-withthe-bad-grades-means-2016-6. [https://perma.cc/6W6H-G3QH]. While the plaintiffs in Students for
Fair Admissions Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College allege that Harvard’s affirmative action
policy discriminates against Asian American applicants, some point out that this case and a later
investigation into Yale’s admissions practices seeks to “pit marginalized students against each other,
using Asian Americans as the conduit” to ultimately uphold white privilege. Kimmy Yam, Don’t Use
Asians to Maintain White Privilege, Critics Say After DOJ Letter to Yale, NBC NEWS (Aug. 14, 2020,
5:33
PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/don-t-use-asians-maintain-whiteprivilege-critics-say-after-n1236843 [https://perma.cc/GAH4-475T].
39 See Hannah-Jones, supra note 13 (stating that, in Fisher, neither Fisher nor her attorney
mentioned that only around fifty students with lower scores than Fisher’s were admitted and that
forty-two of those students were white); ); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 277 n.7
(1978) (noting that plaintiff Bakke’s science and overall grade point averages were below those of
average admits during the first cycle in which he was rejected).
40 Freedmen’s
Bureau
Acts
of
1865
and
1866,
U.S.
Senate,
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/FreedmensBureau.htm
[https://perma.cc/5KYG-KWD4] (last visited May 11, 2021).
41 Id.
42 Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71
VA. L. REV. 753, 763 (1985) (“Objections to the 1866 [Freedmen’s Bureau] bill were similar to those
advanced earlier, but the arguments against special treatment for blacks were more fully
developed.”).
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“giv[ing] them favors that the poor white boy in the North cannot get.”43
Despite such staunch opposition, Congress reached an agreement on the bill’s
necessity and constitutionality and passed the law—only for President
Andrew Johnson to veto the bill, unwilling to provide social support for Black
Americans when white Americans were not afforded the same assistance.44
In the wake of the veto, some congressmen seemed to view the Fourteenth
Amendment as providing a Constitutional foothold for the protections
afforded in the vetoed Act.45 For many legislators, the Fourteenth
Amendment had the advantage of providing broader protections than the
Freedmen’s Bureau could ever seek to achieve, and some viewed the
Amendment as simply another means of achieving the goals set forth in the
Freedmen’s Bureau discussions.46 Thus, at its inception, the Fourteenth
Amendment was in many ways a mechanism of directly redressing the harms
of slavery and lasting discrimination against African Americans.
After the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, the Supreme Court
discussed the interests at play in the Amendment’s creation in the
Slaughterhouse Cases. There, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of
a New Orleans regulation mandating the closure of all slaughterhouses and
stock landings in the city to create a single “grand slaughter-house.”47 The
plaintiffs, who worked as butchers in New Orleans, argued that this statute
violated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments in that they mandated
involuntary servitude and deprived them of their “life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.”48 In evaluating these claims, the Supreme Court
noted that
[O]n the most casual examination of the language of these
amendments, no one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading
purpose found in them all, lying at the foundation of each, and without
which none of them would have been even suggested; we mean the
freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that
freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen

CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 401 (1866) (quoting Senator MacDougall).
Schnapper, supra note 42, at 769.
Id. at 785-86 (detailing how supporters believed the Act and amendment to be
“complementary” and how Congress may have adopted the Fourteenth Amendment “in part to
provide a constitutional basis for the Freedmen’s Bureau Act.”).
46 Id. at 785 (explaining supporters’ beliefs that Congress, aware of the “racial limitations in
the Freedmen’s Bureau programs” could not have passed the Fourteenth Amendment with the
understanding that it would “forbid the adoption of such remedies by itself or the states”).
47 Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 40, 43 (1872).
48 Id. at 43-44.
43
44
45
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from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited
dominion over him.49
The Court, while acknowledging that the protections of the
Reconstruction Amendments were not explicitly limited to Black citizens,
underscored that an accurate reading of these amendments must consider that
the “pervading spirit of them all” was the desire to remedy the evils of chattel
slavery in the United States.50
Within a matter of years, the Court began to broaden this relatively
narrow understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment given rampant
discrimination against Chinese Americans. In 1880, the city of San Francisco
passed an ordinance requiring that any individual running a laundromat not
built of brick or stone must obtain approval from the board of supervisors;
failure to comply would result in substantial fines or imprisonment for a
maximum of six months.51 Yick Wo, a Chinese national residing in San
Francisco, had been operating a laundromat in the same wooden building for
over twenty years.52 Although local authorities repeatedly found Wo’s
business to be up to code, he and 150 other Chinese nationals and Chinese
Americans were arrested for failure to obtain approval for operating wooden
laundromats.53 However, eighty non-Chinese individuals who ran
laundromats under similar conditions were allowed to continue their
businesses freely.54 Wo and other Chinese laundromat owners had repeatedly
requested approval from the board of supervisors, only to have their
applications denied, while similarly situated non-Chinese laundromat
owners’ applications were approved (with only one exception).55 The Court
determined that this disparate treatment violated the federal Constitution,
given that the regulation
divides the [laundromat] owners or occupiers into two classes . . . by
an arbitrary line, on one side of which are those who are permitted to
pursue their industry by the mere will and consent of the supervisors,
and on the other those from whom that consent is withheld, at their
mere will and pleasure.56
Justice Matthews, writing the opinion of the Court, opined that the
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment “are universal in their application,
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

Id. at 71.
Id. at 72.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 357-58 (1886).
Id. at 358.
Id. at 359.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 368.
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to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any
differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the
laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.”57
At first blush, the Court’s reading of the Fourteenth Amendment appears
inherently racialized. Justice Matthews confirmed that the Fourteenth
Amendment applied to individuals of all races residing in the United States.
However, this interpretation effectively stripped the Amendment of its racial
contours by emphasizing the law’s universality.58 Where Justice Miller in the
Slaughterhouse Cases looked to the historical context of the Fourteenth
Amendment and accordingly limited its reading to the harmful vestiges of
slavery, Justice Matthews evaluated the law apart from its original framing.
Yick Wo carved out important rights for people of color beyond African
Americans and is consistent with the underlying aims of the Fourteenth
Amendment—protecting individuals from marginalized ethnic and racial
groups from white American oppression. This holding was particularly salient
in its provision of substantive rights to Chinese Americans when the United
States began restricting their ability to live and work domestically.59 At the
same time, the Court’s reasoning provided a foothold for white Americans to
solidify their own privileges and hinder change which could benefit people of
color. By interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment as one that affords
universal protections within the United States rather than cabining its
protections to marginalized groups, the Supreme Court—either wittingly or
unwittingly—subtly paved the path for future courts to apply the law to
programs which would remediate the legacy of the very racial oppression
Chinese Americans and other people of color challenged. After Yick Wo, the
Fourteenth Amendment applied to all racial groups, and the Court thus had
clear precedent to use the Amendment as a roadblock to policies which
remedied racial marginalization at the expense of white individuals.
The Supreme Court adopted this more expansive approach to the
Fourteenth Amendment over the next century when reviewing racist and
marginalizing statutes. In Hirabayashi v. United States, the Court considered
the constitutionality of a curfew imposed on Japanese Americans and
Id. at 369.
See generally Thomas W. Joo, Yick Wo Re-Visited: Nonblack Nonwhites and Fourteenth
Amendment History, U. ILL. L. REV. 1427, 1427-28 (2008) (discussing the expansion of the protections
of the Fourteenth Amendment to people of color beyond Black individuals).
59 See Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, 59 (repealed 1943) (“[T]he coming of Chinese
laborers to the United States [will] be, and the same is hereby, suspended; and during such
suspension it shall not be lawful for any Chinese laborer to come, or, having so come after the
expiration of said ninety days, to remain within the United States.”); The Chinese Exclusion Case,
130 U.S. 581, 582 (1889) (discussing the case of Chae Chan Ping, who briefly left the United States
prior to the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act only to be barred from reentry following the Act’s
passage).
57
58
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Japanese nationals residing in the United States during the Second World
War.60 Although the Court was tasked with evaluating Hirabayashi’s claims
under the Fifth Amendment, it nevertheless considered the implications such
a policy might have for the doctrine of equal protection.61 Despite concluding
that wartime interests overrode any concerns regarding racial discrimination,
Chief Justice Stone opined that “distinctions between citizens solely because
of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose
institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality. For that reason,
legislative classification or discrimination based on race alone has often been
held to be a denial of equal protection.”62
More than two decades later, the Court in Loving v. Virginia, striking down
an anti-miscegenation law, borrowed this exact language from Hirabayashi to
underscore that the Virginia law barring interracial marriage ran afoul of the
Equal Protection Clause.63 While, unlike in Loving, the Court in Hirabayashi
ultimately upheld the racially invidious statute, both cases, in adopting the
aforementioned language, underscored that the Fourteenth Amendment is
not limited in scope to descendants of enslaved African peoples. Instead, the
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment could be claimed by individuals of
any race.64
These three cases served as the foundation of modern affirmative action
jurisprudence by shaping the Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court commendably eschewed the Slaughterhouse Court’s
narrow interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment to expand its
protections to Asian-Americans and interracial marriages, providing
substantive rights to members of marginalized groups who hoped to enjoy
the rights previously granted exclusively to white Americans. However, the
Court’s expansion of these rights ironically paved the path to an
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment which would ultimately prop
up the interests of the white majority and stymie attempts to gain further
equity for marginalized groups through affirmative action policies. By
asserting that the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections extended to all
individuals, the Court provided a shield which white individuals could invoke
See generally, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 81 (1943).
Id. at 100.
Id.
388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
See id. at 12 (“To deny this fundamental freedom [of marriage] on so unsupportable a basis
as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so subversive of the principle
of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State’s citizens of
liberty without due process of law.”); Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100 (“Distinctions between citizens
solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions
are founded upon the doctrine of equality. For that reason, legislative classification or discrimination
based on race alone has often been held to be a denial of equal protection.”).
60
61
62
63
64
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against affirmative action policies which would provide more equitable
opportunities for marginalized groups at the expense of white Americans.
In the wake of these cases, the Court even interpreted the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 in a way that reflected the concept that classifications negatively
impacting any racial group were invidious and unlawful. The Civil Rights Act
is substantively distinct from the Fourteenth Amendment in a variety of
ways, such as its explicit prohibition of discrimination on the basis of “race,
color, religion, sex, or natural origin,” but the underlying principles of equal
protection pervade the Act’s language.65 The years leading up to the
legislation’s enactment were punctuated by severe and pervasive violence
against Black Americans who sought equal treatment under the law—civil
rights leader Medgar Evers was killed on his doorstep, lunch counter sit-ins
spread across the country, and young students joined in on peaceful protests
that turned violent against them.66 Even though the Civil Rights Act was
created in response to the strengthening movement for African American
civil rights in the 1960s,67 the Court began interpreting this legislation in a
way that protected not only African Americans and other historically
marginalized groups, but also white Americans who felt targeted by
affirmative action policies in schools and workplaces.68 Indeed, President
Kennedy hoped that the Civil Rights Act would ensure that “every American
[can] enjoy the privileges of being American, without regard to his race or his
color.”69
To this end, one decade after Loving, the Court built upon its previous
conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment protected all citizens by invoking
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to block an affirmative action policy which
would protect Black individuals from termination at the expense of their
white coworkers.70 In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Company, a
white union member sued the Santa Fe Trail Transportation Company for his
65 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 251, 254 (describing the duties of the
Commission on Civil Rights as, among other things, “study[ing] and collect[ing] information
concerning legal developments constituting a denial of equal protection of the laws under the
Constitution because of race, color, religion or natural origin or in the administration of justice”).
66 Paulette Brown, The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 527, 527 (2014).
67 See H.R. REP. NO. 914, pt. 2, at 21 (“The transition from all-Negro to integrated schools is
at best a difficult problem of adjustment for teachers and students alike . . . It is clear then that the
Congress must enact legislation empowering the Federal government to disseminate information
concerning desegregation plans, problems, and possible solutions . . . .”).
68 See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279 (1976) (holding that Title VII
applied to white employees in the same way it applied to Black employees in an employment
discrimination lawsuit).
69 President John F. Kennedy, Report to the American People on Civil Rights (June 11, 1964)
(transcript available at https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/about-jfk/historic-speeches/televisedaddress-to-the-nation-on-civil-rights) [https://perma.cc/X243-SPH9] (emphasis added).
70 McDonald, 427 US. at 273-83 (1976).
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termination for “misappropriating [the company’s] property” while a Black
employee who faced similar charges retained his employment.71 There, Justice
Marshall asserted that “Title VII prohibits racial discrimination against the
white petitioners in this case upon the same standards as would be applicable
were they Negroes and Jackson white.”72
In reaching his conclusion, Justice Marshall drew upon the holding of
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, where the plaintiff alleged he was
wrongfully denied re-employment because he was Black.73 Building on the
McDonnell Douglas Court’s assertion that an employer may not use an
employee’s unlawful conduct as pretext for racial discrimination, Justice
Marshall asserted that “The [Civil Rights] Act prohibits all racial
discrimination in employment, without exception for any group of particular
employees . . . .”74 Additionally, Justice Marshall explicitly rejected the
argument that the Civil Rights Act, given its history, should only be extended
to discrimination against Black Americans, noting that while the immediate
context and motivation for the creation of the Civil Rights Act was the
protection of Black Americans’ civil rights, the Act’s drafters adopted “broad
language” with the intent to include individuals of all backgrounds—
including white Americans.75 In arriving at this conclusion, Justice Marshall
referenced a Senate floor debate regarding the purpose of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866; there, Senator Trumbull responded to Senator Davis’ concerns
that the bill would protect only Black Americans at the expense of white
Americans’ privileges:
Sir, this bill applies to white men as well as black men. It declares that
all persons in the United States shall be entitled to the same civil
rights, the right to the fruit of their own labor, the right to make
contracts, the right to buy and sell, and enjoy liberty and happiness;
and that is abominable and iniquitous and unconstitutional! Could
anything be more monstrous or more abominable than for a member
of the Senate to rise in his place and denounce with such epithets as
these a bill, the only object of which is to secure equal rights to all the
citizens of the country, a bill that protects a white man just as much as
a black man?76

Id. at 275-76.
Id. at 280.
Id. at 281-82. See generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973)
(“Petitioner may justifiably refuse to rehire one who was engaged in unlawful, disruptive acts against
it, but only if this criterion is applied alike to members of all races.”).
74 McDonald, 427 U.S. at 283.
75 Id. at 289.
76 Id. at 290; CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 599 (1866).
71
72
73
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This exchange between Senators Trumbull and Davis exemplifies the
ways in which even the white drafters of remedial legislation such as the Civil
Rights Act insisted on safeguarding white privilege and interests even if the
law’s original goal was the provision of substantive rights to a historically
marginalized racial group. Senator Davis’ objections to the bill clearly
demonstrate a willingness of white individuals to accept protections for Black
people—but only if lawmakers considered the status and privileges of white
Americans as though both white and Black interests were equally susceptible
to unlawful or suspect discrimination.
This desire to include white individuals under the Civil Rights Act’s
protective umbrella evidences an unwillingness to safeguard the rights of
marginalized racial and ethnic groups without considering the desires of
white individuals. In the years following the McDonald decision, the Court
embodied the very tendency to center white desires and interests reflected in
the aforementioned Senate debate. This resulted in the adoption of a standard
for reviewing affirmative action claims which created additional burdens for
schools looking to achieve greater diversity in the wake of discrimination
against Black individuals and other people of color in higher education.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION JURISPRUDENCE AND
THE RACE-NEUTRAL ALTERNATIVE TEST AS AN OUTGROWTH OF
WHITE CENTERING
As entities in the United States ranging from universities to employers
sought to contend with the legacy of slavery, Jim Crow, and disparate
treatment of Black Americans and other people of color, the Court refined its
interpretation of both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act
in a way that nevertheless protected white interests. In the years after the
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, employers enacted affirmative
action policies which sought to shield Black employees from adverse
employment action, particularly given that many industries had clear
disparities in the number of Black and white employees.77 Subsequently,
institutions of higher education looked to provide some means of addressing
the lack of Black and other people of color on their campuses through
affirmative action admissions policies of varying natures. Unsurprisingly,

77 See generally United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 198 (1979) (discussing an
aluminum plant’s affirmative action plan setting aside recent openings for Black Americans);
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 272 (1986) (discussing a school district’s policy of
firing only white teachers to “remedy societal discrimination by providing ‘role models’ for minority
schoolchildren”); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 454 (1980) (discussing an affirmative action
program aimed at providing financial support for minority groups which were historically
economically disadvantaged).
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white plaintiffs alleged that such policies violated the Constitution or the
Civil Rights Act.
In addressing these lawsuits, the Court developed a jurisprudence that
held equality, rather than equity, as paramount. Just as Black individuals could
not be treated differently because of their race, the Court reasoned, white
employees and college applicants could not be discriminated against because
of their race. Over the years, the Court established two major principles for
addressing affirmative action cases. First, a court must apply strict judicial
scrutiny to any affirmative action policy that considers race. Second, any
entity defending a race-based affirmative action policy must be able to show
that they first considered race-neutral alternatives to achieve similar levels of
diversity. In this section, I show both developments track the Court’s
tendency to protect white interests by entrenching white “innocence” in racial
wrongdoing, emphasizing that white individuals do not deserve disparate
treatment when the goal is remedying past and ongoing racial harm.
A. White Centering in Reviewing Remedial Policies in Employment
Much of today’s affirmative action jurisprudence developed in response
to the Supreme Court’s holdings in cases regarding employers who sought to
address questions of racial inequity within their workplaces. In the wake of
the Civil Rights movement and the resulting Civil Rights Act of 1964, some
public and private sector employers adopted policies with a goal of remedying
historical racial discrimination.78 Predictably, white employees alleged that
such policies violated the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act. It was through these employment discrimination cases that the
Supreme Court developed the language and precedent to address affirmative
action plans within the context of colleges and universities. By focusing its
analysis on the potential detriments these affirmative action plans may have
on white individuals, the Supreme Court laid the foundation for its “raceneutral alternative” test within the context of academic affirmative action
plans.
In United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, manufacturer Kaiser Aluminum
& Chemical Corporation (“Kaiser”) and the United Steelworkers of America
created an affirmative action plan in an attempt to remedy the legacy of
78 See generally United Steelworkers, 443 U.S. 193, 198 (1979) (addressing an aluminum plant’s
affirmative action plan which set aside 50% of recent openings in employment training programs to
rectify historical racial imbalances in the company’s craftwork department); Fullilove, 448 U.S. 448,
454 (1980) (discussing an affirmative action program aimed at providing financial support for
minority groups which were historically economically disadvantaged); Wygant, 476 U.S. 267, 272
(1986) (discussing a school district’s policy of firing only white teachers to “remedy societal
discrimination by providing ‘role models’ for minority schoolchildren”).

2021]

Centering Whiteness

225

discrimination in its historically white craftwork department.79 As a result of
racially discriminatory hiring and employment practices, Black employees
comprised only 1.83% of the skilled craftworkers at the plant, despite the fact
that the surrounding area was 39% Black.80 To address this disparity, Kaiser
set aside, for the plant’s Black employees, 50% of openings in its craftwork
training programs.81 In response to this initiative, white employees filed a
class action against Kaiser, alleging that the reservation of slots for Black
employees resulted in unfair preferential treatment of junior Black employees
and discrimination against more senior white employees.82 Ultimately, the
Supreme Court held that “Title VII’s prohibition in §§703(a) and (d) against
racial discrimination does not condemn all private, voluntary, race-conscious
affirmative action plans.”83 Here, the Court gave the green light to the
corporate affirmative action program given that its goal was to “break down
old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy.”84 This holding appeared
relatively promising for affirmative action efforts given that it enabled private
employers to self-evaluate their hiring and promotion practices and make
changes to promote racial representation and equity. Moreover, the Court, in
reaching its conclusion, appeared unwilling to read Title VII in a way that
blocked attempts to address “the plight of the Negro in our economy.”85
The Court later modified its approach to affirmative action in Fullilove v.
Klutznick. There, the Court upheld an affirmative action policy but asserted
that such policies warranted heightened judicial scrutiny. The legislation at
issue in Fullilove, the Public Works Employment Act, included a “minority
business enterprise” (“MBE”) provision requiring that grants could not be
made to any public works project unless at least 10% of each grant would go
towards MBEs.86 That same year, several firms working in construction and
HVAC filed a complaint against the Secretary of Commerce and the State
and City of New York, alleging that the MBE provision unlawfully
discriminated against non-minority businesses under the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause.87
In reviewing the statute, the Court underscored that any legislation
adopting racial classifications must be closely scrutinized, regardless of

79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87

United Steelworkers, 443 U.S. at 197-98.
Id. at 198-99.
Id. at 198.
Id. at 199.
Id. at 208.
Id.
Id. at 202 (quoting Senator Humphrey’s remarks in 110 CONG. REC. 6548 (1964)).
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 453-54.
Id. at 455.
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intent.88 The Court maintained that “by its objective of remedying the
historical impairment of access, the MBE provision can have the effect of
awarding some contracts to MBE’s which otherwise might be awarded to
other businesses, who may themselves be innocent of any prior discriminatory
actions.”89 Weighing the benign intent of the statute against the incidental
detriments the regulation would pose to non-minority businesses, Justice
Burger, writing for the majority, concluded that “[w]hen effectuating a
limited and properly tailored remedy to cure the effects of prior
discrimination, such ‘a sharing of the burden’ by innocent parties is not
impermissible.”90 While the majority ultimately maintained that such
affirmative action plans were constitutionally permissible, the language of
white “innocence” framed both the majority’s analysis and that of future
courts assessing affirmative action plans. By portraying white individuals as
“innocent” within the context of racial discrimination, the Court presented a
situation in which blameless members of the majority are forced to bear the
burden of legislation seeking to remedy historical racial discrimination.
The language of innocence ultimately removed white individuals from the
racist and oppressive past of the United States and underscored that the
affirmative action plans might be unfair to nonminority individuals, though
nonetheless necessary. Thus, while the Court ultimately upheld the statutory
provision, its language regarding the innocence of white individuals provided
a framework for future courts’ discussion of whether the burden affirmative
action plans would place on white individuals could be justified.
The Court continued to view affirmative action plans through the lens of
whiteness several years later in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education. There,
the Court considered a public school’s addition, through a collective
bargaining agreement, of a provision protecting certain minority employees
against layoffs.91 The provision maintained that the percentage of minority
employees laid off could not exceed the percentage of minority individuals
employed by the Board at the time of the layoff.92 Additionally, the provision
required that the most senior employees would be kept on the payroll.93
Following layoffs during two academic years wherein relatively junior
teachers remained on the Board payroll while more senior nonminority
88 Id. at 491 (“Any preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily receive a most
searching examination to make sure that it does not conflict with constitutional guarantees.”).
89 Id. at 484 (emphasis added).
90 Id.
91 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 270 (1986).
92 Id. at 270-71.
93 Id. (“In the event that it becomes necessary to reduce the number of teachers through layoff
from employment by the Board, teachers with the most seniority in the district shall be retained
. . . .”).
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teachers were laid off, the terminated nonminority teachers sued, alleging
that the protective provision violated the Equal Protection Clause and Title
VII.94
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, underscored that plans which use
racial classifications for remedial purposes receive the same level of judicial
scrutiny as those which use classifications to discriminate against historically
marginalized groups.95 The Board must therefore, the Court emphasized,
present both a “compelling governmental interest” justifying the plan and
demonstrate that the plan was “narrowly tailored” to achieve this goal.96
Rejecting the Board’s proposed “role model theory” (wherein maintaining
certain numbers of minority teachers would work to “alleviate the effects of
societal discrimination”), Justice Powell asserted that, absent a finding of
historical racial discrimination within the Board’s employment practices, it
could not be authorized to use racial classifications.97 To that end, Justice
Powell maintained that
[s]ocietal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for
imposing a racially classified remedy . . . [A]s the basis for imposing
discriminatory legal remedies that work against innocent people,
societal discrimination is insufficient and over expansive. In the
absence of particularized findings, a court could uphold remedies that
are ageless in their reach into the past, and timeless in their ability to
affect the future.98
Justice Powell emphasized that while there were certain burdens that may
acceptably be placed on “innocent” individuals, termination of “innocent”
employees was simply untenable.99 By emphasizing the innocence of the
displaced white employees (and white Americans more broadly), the majority
framed the Board’s layoff provision as a remedial measure that was unfairly
severe against innocent employees who ostensibly had no personal
responsibility for the societal woes the Board sought to remedy.

Id. at 272.
Id. at 273 (citing Loving, 388 U.S. at 11) (“This Court has ‘consistently repudiated
‘[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry’ as being ‘odious to a free people
whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality . . . .’”).
96 Id. at 274.
97 Id. (“Rather, the Court has insisted upon some showing of prior discrimination by the
government unit involved before allowing limited use of racial classifications in order to remedy
such discrimination.”).
98 Id. at 276.
99 Id. at 282-83 (“Though hiring goals may burden some [sic] innocent individuals, they simply
do not impose the same kind of injury that layoffs impose. Denial of a future employment
opportunity is not as intrusive as loss of an existing job.”).
94
95
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Although Justice Powell referred to the “innocence” of the displaced white
employees, at no point in the opinion did he provide a framework for
understanding why the petitioners were presumed innocent. In penning his
opinion, Justice Powell did not acknowledge the ways in which the white
employees may have themselves participated in discriminatory behavior or
benefitted from systemic discrimination, racism, or marginalization both
within the school district and without.100 Indeed, this language presents a
view in which racism is comprised of intentional, deliberate, and discrete
acts—where no overt or explicit malice can be detected, there is no racism.
In addition, Justice Powell, rather than considering at length the ways in
which such a policy would remedy historical discrimination and racial
inequity, focused his analysis on the injuries the white petitioners sustained
and emphasized that there simply was not enough evidence demonstrating
that this harm was warranted. In this, the Court in Wygant drew a line in the
sand regarding what was too injurious to “innocent” white individuals when
employers considered remedial measures; the Court stopped far short of
allowing employers to protect Black individuals from layoffs on the basis of
societal discrimination. In other words, the Wygant court rejected the Board’s
layoff provision because it was too painful to its white former employees.
Both Fullilove and Wygant referred to the premise that race-based
affirmative action remedies would impose unthinkable burdens upon
innocent parties. However, both cases failed to present any evidence
regarding this presumed innocence. This failing reveals the Court’s
propensity to view racial justice through the lens of whiteness—the Court
presumed all white individuals are innocent within the context of racial
discrimination and therefore should not be subjected to disadvantageous
racial classifications for benign, remedial purposes. By positing the innocence
of white individuals and framing affirmative action as something that is
detrimental to white individuals (rather than something that remediates
ongoing harm to people of color), the Court perpetuated a system in which
affirmative action may only go forward if the burden on white individuals is
minimal and, if there’s to be any burden on white people, it must be absolutely
necessary for racial equity.
100 Although the following sources were published in the years following the Wygant decision,
they nevertheless discuss the ways in which whiteness has, over time, afforded privileges inaccessible
to those who do not identify (or were not identified by others) as white. See, e.g., Jerome McCrystal
Culp, Jr., To the Bone: Race and White Privilege, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1637, 1639 (1999) (discussing the
ways in which white privilege operates to exclude people of color from legal academia); George J.
Sefa Dei, Leeno Luke Karumanchery & Nisha Karumanchery-Luik, Chapter Four: White Power,
White Privilege, 244 COUNTERPOINTS 81, 84 (2004) (“Whiteness is defined by a privilege that goes
unseen: an invisibility that in many ways places our oppressor outside the racial sphere, vested with
a power and social advantage which they themselves need not consider—‘That’s just the way it is.’”).
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While a presumption of innocence is a fundamental tenet of U.S. criminal
law (and rightfully so),101 the application of the “innocent until proven guilty”
principle to white individuals when considering the topic of racial
discrimination is less appropriate and even harmful to people of color. Black
individuals and other people of color have asserted that racism is not a
question of “good and bad” people—racism is instead about the ways in which
white people either advertently or inadvertently uphold systems of
oppression and marginalization.102 White people may be less likely to speak
out against injustices experienced by their non-white counterparts103 and may
even perpetuate systemic inequities despite being considered “nice” people
within their communities.104 White individuals benefit from years of
entrenched systemic racism—for example, Black families have a more difficult
time amassing intergenerational wealth than their white counterparts,105 and
Black and Hispanic drivers are more likely to be searched at traffic stops than
white motorists.106
This is all to say that an assumption that white individuals are “innocent”
victims who would be unfairly penalized by race-based affirmative action
programs dangerously oversimplifies the ways in which whiteness has been
privileged at the expense of other groups’ social, economic, and political
101 To be clear, the phrase “innocent until proven guilty” is not black letter law in the United
States; however, it has been entrenched as a commonly understood idea in cases such as Coffin v.
United States and In re Winship. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (“The principle that
there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and
elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.”);
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (“The reasonable-doubt standard . . . provides concrete
substance for the presumption of innocence . . . .”).
102 Reni Eddo-Lodge, Why I’m No Longer Talking to White People About Race, THE GUARDIAN
(May 30, 2017, 12:30 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/30/why-im-no-longertalking-to-white-people-about-race [https://perma.cc/WTV8-2MUY].
103 See Christina Capatides, White Silence on Social Media: Why Not Saying Anything is Actually
Saying a Lot, CBS NEWS (June 3, 2020, 8:37 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/white-silenceon-social-media-why-not-saying-anything-is-actually-saying-a-lot/ (noting that white individuals’
unwillingness to speak out against racial injustice harms Black people).
104 See Terry Gross, Podcast Examines How “Nice White Parents” Become Obstacles in Integrated
Schools, NPR (October 12, 2020, 1:48 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/10/12/922092481/podcastexamines-how-nice-white-parents-become-obstacles-in-integrated-schools
[https://perma.cc/M3JX-5UU3] (discussing when white families gentrified a neighborhood in New
York City and pushed their children to attend “diverse schools,” effectively leading to a racially
segregated school system that prioritized white students’ education).
105 Emily Badger, Claire Cain Miller, Adam Pearce & Kevin Quealy, Extensive Data Shows
Punishing Reach of Racism for Black Boys, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/03/19/upshot/race-class-white-and-black-men.html
[https://perma.cc/G3VJ-VUZD] (last visited August 26, 2021) (“Most white boys raised in wealthy
families will stay rich or upper middle class as adults, but black boys raised in similarly rich
households will not.”).
106 Findings,
THE
STAN.
OPEN
POLICING
PROJECT,
https://openpolicing.stanford.edu/findings/ [https://perma.cc/6FXC-9KZJ].
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wellbeing. Such an assumption diverts attention from, and effectively
negates, the lived experiences of marginalized communities by asserting that
white individuals are equally susceptible to discrimination¾all while white
individuals have upheld the very systems of oppression that people of color
fight against. In other words, the Court’s framing of whiteness as innocence
stymies meaningful change by claiming that, at a minimum, that whiteness
has been used as a gatekeeping mechanism and a means of disenfranchising
other groups for years.
As we will see, however, the Court did not cease its tendency to center
whiteness in the above case law. The Court adopted the white-centering
framework from the above case law as schools sought to diversify their
admitted classes, placing higher burdens on institutions to protect white
interests.
B. White Centering in Higher Education Affirmative Action Jurisprudence
After the Court in Wygant, Fullilove, and United Steelworkers assessed the
validity of remedial measures within the context of employment, the Court
turned to the growing trend of colleges and universities implementing
affirmative action to increase diversity on their campuses. The
aforementioned cases, however, provided a framework within which the
Court understood affirmative action in higher education: it could not unduly
burden white individuals, who were themselves “innocent” of the legacy of
racial discrimination which schools sought to address. By leaning on the
groundwork laid in Wygant, Fullilove, and United Steelworkers, the Court
formulated a framework wherein white innocence and interests were
paramount: the race-neutral alternative test.
The Court showcased its propensity to center whiteness and operate on a
presumption of white innocence in Regents of University of California v.
Bakke.107 Alan Bakke, a white applicant to the University of California, Davis
Medical School, sued the school after he was denied admission twice, alleging
that the school’s affirmative action plan violated the Equal Protection Clause
and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.108 Specifically, Bakke claimed that the
school’s “special program” which reserved sixteen seats for minority students
and compared minority applicants against each other rather than the larger
pool of applicants constituted unlawful racial discrimination.109 Bakke applied
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 265 (1978).
Id. at 276-78.
Id. at 278. It is worth noting several characteristics of Bakke’s two applications to UC Davis
Medical School. First, Bakke submitted his first application late in the cycle, at which point the
school only admitted applicants with an evaluation “benchmark” score of at least 470, unless the
applicant hailed from a racial minority group. Id. at 276. After this rejection, Bakke sent a letter to
107
108
109
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to the school twice; the first time, his application was submitted late with
lower than average credentials.110 In affirming the holding of the Court of
Appeals, Justice Powell reemphasized that strict scrutiny is warranted for any
racial classification—even if the classification disadvantages groups which
have not been historically targeted or disadvantaged.111 To this point, Justice
Powell emphasized that the Supreme Court has never “held that discreteness
and insularity constitute necessary preconditions to a holding that a particular
classification is invidious.”112
Thus, Justice Powell expanded the language provided in United States v.
Carolene Products Company by emphasizing that strict scrutiny does not
depend on whether the negatively impacted group has been historically
marginalized or disadvantaged; instead policies negatively impacting white
individuals are subject to the same “searching judicial inquiry.”113 Moreover,
Justice Powell opined that the Fourteenth Amendment could not reasonably
apply to only Black individuals, given that since the enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment, a number of additional ethnic and religious
minorities joined American society, including Japanese-, Mexican-, Irish-,
and Chinese-Americans.114 After providing an expansionist view of the Equal
Protection Clause which included white Americans, Justice Powell argued
that schools cannot ask white individuals such as Bakke “to suffer otherwise
impermissible burdens in order to enhance the societal standing of their
ethnic groups.”115 Throughout the opinion, the Court focused primarily on
the exclusion of white students116 as opposed to the potential benefits that the
school’s affirmative action plan would have on Black and other non-white
students. Indeed, the Court spent approximately four pages discussing the
ways in which affirmative action policies unfairly disadvantaged white

the Associate Dean and Chairman of the school’s admission program, complaining that the special
admissions program was an unfair racial quota. Id. While in the subsequent admissions cycle, Bakke’s
application was given a score of 549 out of 600, the same Associate Dean Bakke contacted the
previous admissions cycle acted as Bakke’s faculty interviewer and expressed clear concerns about
Bakke’s candidacy. Id. at 277. Bakke was once again rejected without placement on the waitlist. Id.
110 Id. at 276.
111 Id. at 289-90 (“The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to
one individual and something else when applied to a person of another color. If both are not accorded
the same protection, then it is not equal.”).
112 Id. at 290.
113 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 n.4 (1938) (“[W]hether prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”).
114 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 292-93.
115 Id. at 298.
116 See id. at 305 (emphasizing that schools should implement affirmative action plans “without
excluding individuals belonging to any other group from enjoyment of the relevant opportunity”).
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individuals,117 but swiftly discussed the benefits of such policies in
approximately one page.118 In its review of Bakke’s claims, the Court hardly
considered the benefits of this system while underscoring the detrimental
effects on Bakke and similarly situated students. By centering the desires and
expectations of white students such as Bakke, the Court positioned
affirmative action plans like that implemented by UC Davis Medical School
as an undue burden on innocent individuals, regardless of how commendable
the goal might be.
The Court further focused its analysis on the perceived hardships
affirmative action plans would present to white individuals in Grutter v.
Bollinger by introducing an additional test for considering whether a school
could adopt a race-conscious admissions policy: the “race-neutral alternative”
test.119 In Grutter, the white plaintiff alleged that the University of Michigan
Law School’s affirmative action plan, which sought to enroll a “‘critical mass’
of [underrepresented] minority students” by considering race in applicant
evaluations, violated the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act.120 While the Court disagreed with the plaintiff ’s argument that
the plan was not narrowly tailored to the school’s diversity goals because raceneutral alternatives existed, the Court underscored that “narrow tailoring . . .
require[s] serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral
alternatives that will achieve the diversity the university seeks.”121 The Court
reiterated Wygant’s statement that narrow tailoring requires consideration of
“lawful alternative and less restrictive means” prior to launching race-based
affirmative action plans.122
The Grutter Court thereby clearly increased the requirement for entities
looking to initiate affirmative action plans—the standard was no longer
simply that “less restrictive” methods should be considered, but that those
alternative methods must be race-neutral. And while the Grutter court
ultimately allowed the University of Michigan Law School to move forward
in its race-conscious affirmative action plan, the Court nevertheless laid out
the framework for protecting white interests by requiring schools to first
consider race-neutral alternatives.
The Grutter Court’s added “race-neutral alternative” requirement
persisted in the following years, with the Supreme Court applying the
standard to Abigail Fisher’s Equal Protection claims in Fisher v. University of
Texas, requiring schools to first ensure that disrupting white interests was
117
118
119
120
121
122

Id. at 297-99, 319-320.
Id. at 313-14.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003).
Id. at 316-317.
Id. at 339.
Id. at 339-40 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986).
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absolutely necessary. In Fisher, the white plaintiff alleged that the University
of Texas’ affirmative action policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment by
considering race in its admissions process and rejecting the plaintiff ’s
application.123 While the Court ultimately upheld the affirmative action plan,
it modified the “race-neutral alternative” test put forth in Grutter by asserting
that “the court must ultimately be satisfied that no workable race-neutral
alternatives would produce the educational benefits of diversity. If ‘a nonracial
approach’ . . . could promote the substantial interest about as well and at
tolerable administrative expense,’ then the university may not consider
race.”124 The Court, therefore, emphasized that race-conscious affirmative
action must be, in some sense, a last resort. In an ideal world, the Court
implied, white applicants should not be burdened by schools’ attempts to
diversify their campuses. In this shift, the Court further implicitly
underscored its commitment to ensuring that white students’ interests and
desires are protected and considered before any affirmative action is
undertaken. And while the ultimate burden, according to the Court, remains
with the plaintiff to show the presence of workable alternatives, the Court
nevertheless maintained that the school bore the burden of demonstrating
that race-neutral alternatives were insufficient to achieve their goals.125
Most recently, the “race-neutral alternative” test has persisted at the
appellate court level, with the First Circuit implementing this test in its
review of Harvard College’s affirmative action plan—which, ironically, Justice
Powell referenced in Bakke as an example of a lawful affirmative action
initiative.126 In Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of
Harvard College, nonprofit Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. alleged that
Harvard College’s undergraduate affirmative action plan discriminated
against Asian American applicants by considering race in its admissions
system.127 After considering a substantial amount of evidence from Harvard,

123
124
125
126

Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 306 (2013).
Id. at 312 (quoting Wygant 476 U.S. at 280 n.6) (emphasis added).
Id.
Justice Powell noted:
[Harvard’s] program treats each applicant as an individual in the admissions process.
The applicant who loses out on the last available seat to another candidate receiving a
‘plus’ on the basis of ethnic background will not have been foreclosed from all
consideration for that seat simply because he was not the right color or had the wrong
surname . . . . His qualifications would have been weighed fairly and competitively . . . .

Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 (1978).
127 Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard Coll., 397 F. Supp. 3d
126, 131-32 (D. Mass. 2019), aff ’d by 980 F.3d 157 (1st Cir. 2020). In February 2021, the plaintiffs
petitioned for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. Students for Fair Admissions, Inc.
v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/case-
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the court underscored that “if ‘a nonracial approach . . . could promote the
[school’s] substantial interest [in diversity] about as well and at tolerable
administrative expense,’” the school would be prohibited from considering
race in its admissions procedures.128 This standard, however, is less than clear,
raising the questions of (1) what it means for an admissions plan to work
“about as well” as a race-conscious affirmative action plan; and (2) what
constitutes a “tolerable administrative expense.”
The court did not address either of these questions explicitly; rather, the
court simply noted that alternatives such as eliminating early action and
strengthening recruitment efforts “are all ‘available’ and ‘workable’ in some
form and at varying costs, but they would likely have no meaningful impact
on racial diversity.”129 In effect, this standard appears to heighten the burden
on schools even further than that in Fisher, regardless of the court’s intention.
While the general trend has been for courts to uphold schools’ affirmative
action policies, there is a clear reliance on the “race-neutral alternative” test
that originated in Grutter. There is therefore a clear connecting line between
the white centering which occurred in Bakke and more recent affirmative
action cases. While Bakke never used the language of “race-neutral
alternative” or required their consideration, it laid critical groundwork for
this test by dwelling on the ways the school’s affirmative action plan operated
to the detriment of students like Bakke, rather than dwelling more extensively
on the potential benefits such a program could present to non-white and
disadvantaged students.
IV. RACE-NEUTRAL ALTERNATIVES CENTER WHITE INTERESTS AT
THE EXPENSE OF NON-WHITE STUDENTS
Existing jurisprudence on affirmative action policies, as previously
discussed, emphasizes that schools must determine that no workable raceneutral alternative exists prior to launching a race-based affirmative action
program. Put differently, the Supreme Court requires schools to first protect
white applicants’ interests in admission and only consider race if absolutely
necessary. But what do schools interested in diversifying their campuses and
reversing past harm lose in this standard? And how does the race-neutral
alternative test run counter to the original spirit of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Civil Rights Act? By requiring that schools first
prioritize the interests of white students in any attempt to diversify their
campuses, the Court entrenched the presumption of white “innocence”
files/cases/students-for-fair-admissions-inc-v-president-fellows-of-harvard-college/
[https://perma.cc/U5K2-G625].
128 Students for Fair Admissions, 397 F. Supp. 3d at 199-200 (quoting Fisher, 570 U.S. at 312).
129 Id. at 200.
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wherein beneficiaries of race-based affirmative action wrongly obtain an
education which, by default, should belong to white students.130
As affirmative action has attracted increasingly negative public attention
over the years, and with the Court’s race-neutral alternative litmus test, social
scientists and other interested parties have sought to introduce methods of
diversifying schools that do not consider applicants’ race. Proponents of raceneutral affirmative action plans assert that campus diversity may be obtained
by using factors which often act as proxies to race and ethnicity, such as
socioeconomic status. The most commonly discussed alternatives include
income- and geography-based affirmative action.131
Proponents of such alternatives argue, among other things, that raceconscious affirmative action “set[s] up minority students for failure” by
admitting students who are “underqualified” for the institutions in
question.132 Others argue that race-conscious affirmative action amounts to
“gross unfairness” by assisting students who “have never been subject to any
significant amount of racial animus.”133 Still others contend that, while race is
often correlated with class, race-based affirmative action may nevertheless fail
to address the lack of socioeconomic diversity within institutions of higher
education.134
The proponents of class-based affirmative action have proposed numerous
variations which purport to mimic the diversity benefits of race-conscious
affirmative action. The most selective high schools in the Chicago Public
School system sought to achieve diversity through a class-based affirmative
action plan wherein certain Chicago neighborhoods were assigned to one of
130 For a more in-depth discussion on the language of whiteness, see David Simson, Whiteness
as Innocence, 96 DENV. L. REV. 635 (2019) (providing a more in-depth discussion of the language of
innocence).
131 See generally, Richard Rothstein, Should Race-Based Affirmative Action be Replaced by RaceNeutral Preferences for Low-Income Students? The Discussion Continues, ECONOMIC POL’Y INST. (Aug.
4,
2014,
11:43
AM),
https://www.epi.org/blog/race-based-affirmative-action-replaced-race/
[https://perma.cc/DA7U-HYEC] (discussing the merits and pitfalls of income-based affirmative
action); SIGAL ALON, RACE, CLASS, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 11 (2015) (discussing class-based
affirmative action); Sheryll Cashin, Place, Not Race: Affirmative Action and the Geography of
Educational Opportunity, 47 UNIV. MICH. J.L. REFORM 935, 936 (2014) (arguing for a geographybased affirmative action scheme in which “use of place, rather than race, in diversity programming
will better approximate the structural disadvantages many children of color actually endure”); Fisher,
570 U.S. at 305 (discussing Texas’ Top Ten Percent Plan, which granted automatic admission to Texas
public universities for students in the top ten percent of all Texas high schools).
132 ALON, supra note 131, at 80.
133 Courtney Rozen, How Americans Feel About Affirmative Action in Higher Education,
NPR (Nov. 1, 2018, 9:37 AM), npr.org/2018/11/01/658960740/how-americans-feel-about-affirmativeaction-in-higher-education [https://perma.cc/PP5A-3DM5].
134 Rachel Lu, Two Scholars Debate Race- Versus Class-Based Affirmative Action, THE
MIDDLEBURY CAMPUS (Dec. 5, 2019), https://middleburycampus.com/47695/news/two-scholarsdebate-race-versus-class-based-affirmative-action/ [https://perma.cc/UA9A-LFCW].
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four categories using an index combining median family income, adult
education, home ownership, frequency of single-parent households, and nonEnglish speakers as delineators.135 In that plan, schools filled 40% of their
classes with applicants with the highest standardized test scores and the
remaining 60% of slots using the tiered socioeconomic system by allocating
slots equally between the four tiers.136 In subsequent years, the school altered
this system to reserve 70% of slots for admission based on the socioeconomic
tiers.137
In a somewhat less sophisticated approach, the Texas Top Ten Percent
plan granted in-state high school seniors in the top ten percent of their
graduating classes automatic admission to any Texas public university.138 Over
the past two decades, schools in California and Florida have implemented
similar systems wherein high school students falling in the top four and
twenty percent of their graduating classes, respectively, are granted automatic
admission into one state university (although this might not be the school of
the student’s choosing).139 Other schools have eschewed formal admissions
policies in favor of targeted recruitment strategies which aim to attract
greater numbers of applicants hailing from underrepresented minority
backgrounds. For example, some schools have provided more robust
scholarship opportunities to offset the cost of attendance for minority
students, such as the University of Texas’ Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship
which is offered to applicants hailing from schools that serve largely
underrepresented minority students.140
To date, many studies have found that race-neutral alternatives typically
fall short of providing the same benefits as race-based affirmative action plans,
indicating that the courts’ requirement that no workable race-neutral
alternative exist prior to starting race-based admissions policies is an
unrealistic standard. At best, race-neutral alternatives to affirmative action
that seek to act as proxies for race still fail to achieve similar levels of diversity
in classes of admitted students. Glenn Ellison and Parag Pathak’s 2016 study
of selective Chicago public schools found that even the closest proxies for
race, such as income, might still fail to satisfactorily increase enrollment of
135 Glenn Ellison & Parag A. Pathak, The Efficiency of Race-Neutral Alternatives to Race-Based
Affirmative Action: Evidence from Chicago’s Exam Schools 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working
Paper No. 22589, 2016).
136 Id. at 2-3.
137 Id. at 3.
138 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 305 (2013).
139 Marvin Lim, Percent Plans: A “Workable, Race-Neutral Alternative” to Affirmative Action?, 39
J. COLL. & U. L. 127, 128-129 (2013).
140 Morning Edition, Alternatives Emerge to Affirmative Action, NPR (Apr. 25, 2014, 5:03 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2014/04/25/306718048/alternatives-emerge-to-affirmative-action
[https://perma.cc/ETH4-CRLZ].
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students from underrepresented minority backgrounds—the study
determined that socioeconomic factors used as proxies were still less effective
than simply considering applicants’ race.141 Mark Long, after theorizing that
the Texas Top Ten Percent plan was limited in its ability to predict applicants’
race for diversity purposes, found that a completely race-neutral system
would admit 3.3% fewer non-white students than a race-based affirmative
action plan.142
Others have argued that race-based affirmative action plans “minimiz[e]
the costs of affirmative action to the institution, by reducing the predicted
performance gap between affirmative action students and the rest of the
student body and by minimizing the reputational costs to the school that flow
from less competitive admissions standards.”143 Maria Cancian theorized that,
in fact, many otherwise eligible students from underrepresented backgrounds
would be ineligible for class-based affirmative action despite proponents’
arguments that class stands in as a surefire proxy for race.144 Cancian has also
underscored the difficulty of creating thresholds for socioeconomic class in the
first instance, a statement supported by many others.145
Nevertheless, some researchers have argued that race-neutral alternatives
such as class-based affirmative action do succeed in diversifying college
classrooms. Matthew Gaertner and Melissa Hart argued that an increase in
admissions rates for socioeconomically disadvantaged students at the
University of Colorado indicate that class-based affirmative action does work
and should be implemented as a strategy which circumvents the use of racial
classification.146 This finding, however, is clearly in the minority.
While much research remains to be completed, current evidence appears
to weigh in favor of race-based affirmative action as a means of achieving
racial diversity in U.S. colleges and universities. Class-based and other raceneutral affirmative action alternatives work to assure white Americans that
they will not need to bear the burden of policies which seek to address
141 Ellison & Pathak, supra note 135, at 6 (“[T]he CPS policy is much less efficient when one
tries to use it to keep minority representation anywhere close to its former level.”).
142 Mark C. Long, Is There a “Workable” Race-Neutral Alternative to Affirmative Action in College
Admissions?, 34 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 162, 178 (2015) (observing that a school with traditional
affirmative action plan had an admitted class of which 19.5% identified as underrepresented
minorities, while a school banning such policies admitted a class wherein 16.2% of students identified
as under-represented minorities).
143 Deborah C. Malamud, Assessing Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 452, 455 (1997).
144 Maria Cancian, Race-Based Versus Class-Based Affirmative Action in College Admissions, 17 J.
POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 94, 102 (1998) (“The simulation results . . . suggest that many minority
youths will not be eligible for class-based affirmative action.”).
145 Id. at 103 ( “In contemporary America there is no consensus on the boundaries or even the
relevance of the concept of socioeconomic ‘class.’” (citing grusky and Malamud).
146 Matthew N. Gaertner & Melissa Hart, Considering Class: College Access and Diversity, 7
HARV. L & POL’Y REV. 367, 367-68 (2013).
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systemic educational disparities in light of centuries of racial oppression but
contribute little to racial educational equity. Courts’ insistence on this
standard reflects their continued centering of white interests. By relying on
a standard that simultaneously protects white interests and presents
disadvantageous outcomes for non-white students, courts engage in white
centering even if they ultimately uphold race-conscious affirmative action
policies.
CONCLUSION
The jurisprudence on affirmative action demonstrates that federal courts,
particularly the Supreme Court, have both explicitly and implicitly enforced
a standard that both centers white interests and espouses the idea that white
individuals should not be forced to bear burdens associated with remedying
America’s history of racial oppression. Courts’ discussion of white
“innocence,” positing that such “innocent” individuals should not be
penalized for past wrongdoing, perpetuates a too broad and non-nuanced
understanding of systemic racism and marginalization which hinders
meaningful change within the context of higher education. Moreover,
adopting a “race-neutral alternative” standard creates the false perception that
racial harm can and should be achieved through “painless” mechanisms—that
justice can be obtained by still retaining structures that prioritize whiteness.
As the findings above demonstrate, if schools truly desire to create more
equitable and diverse environments, they must be permitted to consider race
when forming admissions policies. As Justice Marshall lamented in his Bakke
dissenting opinion, an understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Civil Rights Act which protects white interests tears down remedial efforts
with the same language once used to pursue justice for members of
marginalized communities.147
Rather than requiring schools to comport with a standard which centers
white interests to the detriment of historically marginalized minorities,
courts should interpret the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act
as documents which first and foremost protect minority individuals and
efforts to remedy the effects of discrimination against such groups. Moreover,
certain racial classifications can indeed be benign—for instance, when a
school hopes to increase the enrollment of Black, Latinx, and Indigenous
students on their campuses. Rather than continually focusing its analysis on
the potential harms a race-based affirmative action plan could cause to white
147 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 387 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Now, when a State acts to remedy the
effects of that legacy of discrimination, I cannot believe that this same Constitution stands as a
barrier.”).
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students, the Court should shift its discussion to more heavily consider the
potential benefits of an affirmative action plan. To be clear, courts have
included discussions of the benefits of race-conscious affirmative action
policies to varying degrees over the years.148 However, as previously discussed
in their analysis, courts have either considered white interests as comparable
or superior to those of people of color. This Comment urges courts to
consider the ways in which white interests have been held as paramount
throughout the history of affirmative action. Only when courts acknowledge
this reality will they recognize that their current approaches to affirmative
action should draw on the true legislative and social histories of the
Fourteenth Amendment and Civil Rights Act of 1964.

148 See, e.g., Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2210-11 (noting the benefits of a diverse student body, and that
these may be achieved through intentionally increasing the presence of minority students on
campus); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328-30 (agreeing that the law school’s attempts to achieve a “critical
mass” of minority students confers benefits such as “cross-racial understanding”).
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